Sort of... Passion Project! This link has the instructions. This is the link to the folder in Schoology. Assignments are distributed into different grading categories. Due on May 31. Remember: You will be peer-evaluated on three criteria: Learning, Effort, and Quality. We will be presenting in groupsThe way this will work, we will number off in groups of five. We will share our projects for approximately 20 minutes. Then we will switch groups and repeat.
Once we have finished, then you can do the peer evaluation. If you didn't hear someone's presentation, just skip over their name.
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Reminders/Announcements/Due DatesPassion Project! This link has the instructions. This is the link to the folder in Schoology. Assignments are distributed into different grading categories. Due on May 31. Remember: You will be peer-evaluated on three criteria: Learning, Effort, and Quality. North Korea Focused InquiryHow does the US talk with North Korea? List the approaches used by the US when talking with North Korea and provide examples of each. Document A Source A: Priyanka Boghani, article detailing U.S. and North Korea relations, The U.S. and North Korea On the Brink: A Timeline, PBS Frontline, October, 4, 2017 The last few months have seen President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un locked in an escalating war of words. As the rhetoric has intensified, so have fears that words could spill over into military confrontation. Threats, sanctions and missile tests are not new developments in the U.S.-North Korea relationship. What’s different now, experts say, is that the gap in knowledge about what the other side is thinking seems wider than ever, with North Korean officials puzzling over President Trump’s threats, and Americans trying to understandKim Jong-un’s motivations. Here, we examine the turbulent history between the two countries, from North Korea’s work to develop nuclear and missile programs, to U.S. efforts to stop them. Early Ambitions North Korea’s quest for a nuclear weapon can be traced back decades to the Korean War. “They felt that they needed to develop a capability that would deter an American attack,” said Duyeon Kim, a visiting senior fellow at the Seoul-based Korean Peninsula Future Forum. The fear was not unfounded. In 1950, President Harry Truman said there was “active consideration” of using the atomic bomb in the conflict. “Ever since the Korean War, they always assumed that Washington would attack them any day and wipe them out,” Kim said. “The only way for them to survive and not get attacked would be to develop the most powerful weapon on Earth, which would be the nuclear bomb.” With the help of the Soviet Union, North Korea began work on a nuclear complex, and in the early 1980s, built its first power plant, Yongbyon. In these early days, Pyongyang insisted that its aims were peaceful. It became party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, and signed an agreement in 1991 with its rival South Korea in which both countries agreed not to produce or use nuclear weapons. But as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pressed for access to the North’s nuclear waste sites, the country warned that it would withdraw from the NPT. 1994-2001: Clinton Tries for a Deal In early 1994, North Korea threatened to reprocess fuel rods from its nuclear reactor, a step that would give it enough weapons-grade plutonium for five or six nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration considered various responses, including a strikeon the Yongbyon facility, but eventually chose to negotiate with Pyongyang. Amid the crisis, Kim Il-sung— the founding dictator of North Korea, who ruled for more than four decades — died. His son, Kim Jong-il, took over as leader. By October 1994, negotiations resulted in a deal known as the Agreed Framework. Under the framework, North Korea agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities, in exchange for a move toward normalizing relations with the United States. North Korea would also receive shipments of fuel oil and assistance with constructing light-water reactor power plants (which would have safeguards to ensure that fuel could not be diverted to weapons). “The North Koreans agreed to the deal because there was a shift in the geopolitical situation in the late 1980s, early 1990s,” said Joel Wit, a senior fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and one of the negotiators of the Agreed Framework. “First of all, they lost the Soviet Union as their main ally, and secondly, the Chinese were shifting towards establishing better relations with South Korea,” Wit said. “And so the North Koreans made a strategic decision that if they could secure better relations with the United States, they were willing to pay the price. And the price was, of course, their nuclear program.” North Korea shut down its nuclear reactor, and stalled construction of two others. In 1998, it test-fired an intermediate-range missile — the Taepo Dong-1, with an estimated range of 900 to 1,800 miles — that failed. Nevertheless, negotiations kept on. North Korea agreed to a moratorium on testing medium- and long-range missiles as long as talks with the U.S. continued. Madeleine Albright, then the secretary of state, visited North Korea’s capital in 2000 and met Kim Jong-il. The North Koreans hoped Clinton would also visit before he left office, moving North Korea and the United States closer to normalizing relations. But time ran out with the end of the Clinton presidency. 2001-2003: The Framework Collapses When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, his administration took a more hardline approach to North Korea, postponing talks and expressing skepticism about whether Pyongyang was adhering to the Agreed Framework. North Korea warnedWashington that such tough talk would force it to “strongly react.” Bush listed North Korea among one of three nations in an “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union. Later that year, in October, the administration said that North Korea was secretly enriching uranium – a claim Pyongyang denied. A month later, the fuel oil shipments agreed to under President Clinton were suspended. By the end of 2002, North Korea ordered IAEA inspectors out of the country. The Agreed Framework had collapsed. Experts have described this period as a missed opportunity. Had North Korea not begun enriching uranium, they say, and had the U.S. moved faster to implement its portion of the agreed framework — including the construction of light-water reactors — things may have gone differently. The Bush administration, said Wit, “thought they could bully the North Koreans into stopping cheating.” By January 2003, the relationship hit a new low with North Korea’s official withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Four months later, U.S. officials saidNorth Korea admitted to having at least one nuclear weapon. 2003-2006: Six-Party Talks Begin The Bush administration would re-engage with North Korea later in 2003, joining South Korea, Japan, Russia and China in what came to be known as the Six Party Talks. The talks produced a joint statementin 2005 in which North Korea once again agreed in principle to give up its nuclear weapons program, rejoin the Nonproliferation Treaty and accept IAEA inspections, while maintaining that it had the right to peaceful nuclear energy. In exchange, the five other countries agreed to energy assistance and to discuss giving North Korea light-water reactors “at an appropriate time.” The U.S. and South Korea said they would not deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, and the U.S. and Japan said they would move toward normalizing relations. However, progress was short lived. In July 2006, North Korea — angered by U.S. targeting of its financial assetsand the pace of the light-water reactor project — broke its 1999 moratorium on testing medium- and long-range missiles. It launched seven ballistic missiles, including the long-range Taepo Dong-2, which if perfected, would have the ability to hit Alaska. The missile failed. “Under Kim Jong-il’s rule, a useful way of understanding the dynamics of North Korea and the U.S. is the idea of cycles,” says Jung H. Pak, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. “North Korea comes to dialogue, then retracts, using the U.S.’s ‘hostile policy’ as an excuse to conduct missile or nuclear tests, then re-enters dialogue to dampen sanctions implementation or reduce tension.” 2006: A First Nuclear Test In October 2006, the situation reached a dangerous new stage with North Korea’s first nuclear test. The explosion yielded less than a kiloton, per the Nuclear Threat Initiative. For comparison, the atomic bomb that devastated Hiroshima was 15 kilotons. The United Nations responded swiftly with a resolution requiring North Korea to stop testing nuclear weapons and to abandon its missile program. In response, a representative for the regime saidthe nuclear test was “entirely attributable to United States threats, sanctions and pressure.” He accused the Bush administration of responding to North Korea’s “patient and sincere efforts with sanctions and blockades.” The regime’s rhetoric aside, the Six Party talks began to show dividends. In July 2007, North Korea shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, a move confirmed by a visiting IAEA team. It also agreed to disable the facilities, which would make it harder to restart them. In return, it would receive fuel oil and be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. However, disagreements on how to verify North Korea’s actions once again led to stalemate. 2009: A Second Nuclear Test President Barack Obama began his first term with an inaugural address telling“leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict” that “we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your first.” Just three months later, North Korea launched a Unha-2 rocket with the goal of putting a satellite in space. The U.S. and its allies had warned Pyongyang they would consider the launch a violation of U.N. resolutions. The launch failed, and the Security Council again tightened sanctions. Pyongyang, in turn, said it would no longer adhere to any agreements from the Six Party talks and threatened to reactivate its nuclear facilities. Days later, it ordered IAEA inspectorsout of the country. Then, on May 24, North Korea conducted its second underground nuclear test, estimated to measure four kilotons, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. In a statement, it said the test helped “settle the scientific and technological problems” in increasing the power of its nuclear weapons. Again, sanctions followed — first from the U.N. Security Council and then the U.S. By the fall of 2011, Pyongyang hinted that it would be willing to resume multilateral talks, but then suddenly, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il died in December, after holding power for 17 years. His youngest son, Kim Jong-un, was named North Korea’s leader. 2012-2016: Testing Accelerates The pace of ballistic missile testsand nuclear tests would significantly escalate under Kim Jong-un. Despite agreeing to a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests with the Obama administration in February 2012, North Korea once again attempted a space launch with the Unha-3 that April. But the test was a failure — the rocket disintegrated shortly after launch. The U.S. halted food aid in response. In December 2012, North Korea tried again, this time successfullylaunching the Unha-3 rocket and putting an object into orbit for the first time in its history. It maintained that the launch was for peaceful purposes. The rocket was similar in design to a missile that could possibly carry a warhead as far as California. The U.N. Security Council passeda new resolution a month later, condemning the launch and expanding travel bans and asset freezes for certain individuals and organizations. The international response would do little to slow the new leader’s nuclear ambitions. Between 2013 and 2016, North Korea held three more nuclear tests, each more powerful than the last. In September 2016, North Korea claimed to test its first hydrogen bomb, a claim that experts greeted with skepticism. It also continued to make strides in its ballistic missile program. North Korea used the nuclear and missile tests to establish “strategic relevance in the region,” according to Pak. “We can’t underestimate how North Korea was devastated during the Korean War, so the Kim family’s goal is to ensure the country’s survival, but also their own survival.” The missile program, she noted, was “for all of those things — deterring the U.S., deterring South Korea, deterring Japan.” 2017: A War of Words with Trump In 2017, North Korea reached two significant milestones. It successfully test-fired its first intercontinental ballistic missiles in July, capable of reaching Alaska. It once again claimed to successfully test a hydrogen bomb. Whether it was indeed a hydrogen bomb has not been confirmed, but its nuclear test in September was recorded as North Korea’s most powerful yetat an estimated 250 kilotons. When he addressed the U.N. General Assembly in September, Trump saidthat if the U.S. was forced to defend itself or its allies, it would have “no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” Referring to Kim Jong-un as “rocket man,” Trump said the North Korean leader was “on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.” Kim Jong-un respondedto Trump’s speech by calling the U.S. president “mentally deranged” and warning that he would “pay dearly” for threatening to destroy North Korea. He also said Trump’s comments “have convinced me, rather than frightening or stopping me, that the path I chose is correct and that it is the one I have to follow to the last.” Document B Source B: Arshad Mohammed, article highlighting diplomatic efforts by the U.S., U.S. pursues direct diplomacy with North Korea despite Trump rejection, Reuters, October, 31, 2017 WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is quietly pursuing direct diplomacy with North Korea, a senior State Department official said on Tuesday, despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s public assertion that such talks are a waste of time. Using the so-called “New York channel,” Joseph Yun, U.S. negotiator with North Korea, has been in contact with diplomats at Pyongyang’s United Nations mission, the official said, at a time when an exchange of bellicose insults between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has fueled fears of military conflict. While U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Oct. 17 said he would continue “diplomatic efforts ... until the first bomb drops,” the official’s comments were the clearest sign the United States was directly discussing issues beyond the release of American prisoners, despite Trump having dismissed direct talks as pointless. There is no sign, however, that the behind-the-scenes communications have improved a relationship vexed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, the death of U.S. university student Otto Warmbier days after his release by Pyongyang in June and the detention of three other Americans. Word of quiet engagement with Pyongyang comes despite Trump’s comments, North Korea’s weapons advances and suggestions by some U.S. and South Korean officials that Yun’s interactions with North Koreans had been reined in. “It has not been limited at all, both (in) frequency and substance,” said the senior State Department official. Among the points that Yun has made to his North Korean interlocutors is to “stop testing” nuclear bombs and missiles, the official said. North Korea this year conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear detonation and has test-fired a volley of missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that, if perfected, could in theory reach the United States mainland. The possibility that Pyongyang may be closer to attaching a nuclear warhead to an ICBM has alarmed the Trump administration, which in April unveiled a policy of “maximum pressure and engagement” that has so far failed to deter North Korea. At the start of Trump’s presidency, Yun’s instructions were limited to seeking the release of U.S. prisoners. “It is (now) a broader mandate than that,” said the State Department official, declining, however, to address whether authority had been given to discuss North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said China welcomed any dialogue between the United States and North Korea. “We encourage North Korea and the United States to carry out engagement and dialogue,” Hua told reporters, adding that she hoped talks could help return the issue to a diplomatic track for resolution. SANCTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg has urged all United Nations members to fully and transparently implement sanctions against North Korea, which he said has emerged as a global threat. Speaking at the United Nations on Sept. 19, Trump vowed to “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatened the United States or its allies, raising anxieties about the possibility of military conflict. Twelve days later, after Tillerson said Washington was probing for a diplomatic opening, Trump said on Twitter that his chief diplomat was “wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man” - his mocking nickname for the North Korean leader. Democratic U.S. senators introduced a bill on Tuesday they said would prevent Trump from launching a nuclear first strike on North Korea on his own, highlighting the issue days before the Republican’s first presidential trip to Asia. A high-ranking North Korean defector said in Washington on Tuesday that he backed the Trump administration’s policy of pressuring Pyongyang through sanctions, coupled with “maximum engagement” with the leadership and increased efforts to get information into North Korea to educate its people. “I strongly believe in the use of soft power before taking any military actions,” Thae Yong Ho, chief of mission at Pyongyang’s embassy in London until he defected in 2016, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The New York channel is one of the few conduits the United States has for communicating with North Korea, which has itself made clear it has little interest in serious talks before it develops a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the continental United States. The last high-level contact between Yun and the North Koreans was when he traveled to North Korea in June to secure the release of Warmbier, who died shortly after he returned home in a coma, the State Department official said. The Trump administration has demanded North Korea release three other U.S. citizens: missionary Kim Dong Chul and academics Tony Kim and Kim Hak Song. Warmbier’s death was a factor in the chilling of U.S.-North Korean contacts around that time but the biggest impact came from Pyongyang’s stepped-up testing, the official said. The official said, however, that “the preferred endpoint is not a war but some kind of diplomatic settlement” and suggestions that Washington is setting up a binary choice for Pyongyang to capitulate diplomatically or military action were “misleading.” Diplomacy, the official said, “has a lot more room to go.” But Trump’s threats against North Korea are believed to have complicated diplomatic efforts. Document C Source C: Tweets from Donald Trump about North Korea, January, 2, 2018 Document D Source D: Video excerpt highlighting what the US wants the the United Nations to do with North Korea, Inside Story, Al Jazeera News,February, 6, 2018 What are the advantages and disadvantages of how the US talks with North Korea? Create a graphic organizer that lists both benefits and drawbacks to the approaches of talking with North Korea. Document A Source A: Victor Cha, Article that discusses consequences of the US taking an aggressive stance with North Korea, Giving North Korea a ‘bloody nose’ is a huge risk to Americans, Washington Post, January, 30, 2018 Victor Cha is a professor at Georgetown University and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. North Korea, if not stopped, will build an arsenal with multiple nuclear missiles meant to threaten the U.S. homeland and blackmail us into abandoning our allies in Asia. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un will sell these weapons to state and nonstate actors, and he will inspire other rogue actors who want to undermine the U.S.-backed postwar order. These are real and unprecedented threats. But the answer is not, as some Trump administration officials have suggested, a preventive military strike. Instead, there is a forceful military option available that can address the threat without escalating into a war that would likely kill tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Americans. When I was under consideration for a positionin this administration, I shared some of these views.Some may argue that U.S. casualties and even a wider war on the Korean Peninsula are risks worth taking, given what is at stake. But a strike (even a large one) would only delay North Korea’s missile-building and nuclear programs, which are buried in deep, unknown places impenetrable to bunker-busting bombs. A strike also would not stem the threat of proliferation but rather exacerbate it, turning what might be a North Korean moneymaking endeavor into a vengeful effort intended to equip other bad actors against us.tresiba.com I empathize with the hope, espoused by some Trump officials, that a military strike would shock Pyongyang into appreciating U.S. strength, after years of inaction, and force the regime to the denuclearization negotiating table. I also hope that if North Korea did retaliate militarily, the United States could control the escalation ladder to minimize collateral damage and prevent a collapse of financial markets. In either event, the rationale is that a strike that demonstrates U.S. resolve to pursue “all options” is necessary to give the mercurial Kim a “bloody nose.” Otherwise he will remain undeterred in his nuclear ambitions. Yet, there is a point at which hope must give in to logic. If we believe that Kim is undeterrable without such a strike, how can we also believe that a strike will deter him from responding in kind? And if Kim is unpredictable, impulsive and bordering on irrational, how can we control the escalation ladder, which is premised on an adversary’s rational understanding of signals and deterrence? Some have argued the risks are still worth taking because it’s better that people die “over there” than “over here.” On any given day, there are 230,000 Americans in South Korea and 90,000 or so in Japan. Given that an evacuation of so many citizens would be virtually impossible under a rain of North Korean artillery and missiles (potentially laced with biochemical weapons), these Americans would most likely have to hunker down until the war was over. While our population in Japan might be protected by U.S. missile defenses, the U.S. population in South Korea, let alone millions of South Koreans, has no similar active defenses against a barrage of North Korean artillery (aside from counterfire artillery). To be clear: The president would be putting at risk an American population the size of a medium-size U.S. city — Pittsburgh, say, or Cincinnati — on the assumption that a crazy and undeterrable dictator will be rationally cowed by a demonstration of U.S. kinetic power. An alternative coercive strategy involves enhanced and sustained U.S., regional and global pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize. This strategy is likely to deliver the same potential benefits as a limited strike, along with other advantages, without the self-destructive costs. There are four elements to this coercive strategy. First, the Trump administration must continue to strengthen the coalition of U.N. member states it has mustered in its thus far highly successful sanctions campaign. Second, the United States must significantly up-gun its alliances with Japan and South Korea with integrated missile defense, intelligence-sharing and anti-submarine warfare and strike capabilities to convey to North Korea that an attack on one is an attack on all. Third, the United States must build a maritime coalition around North Korea involving rings of South Korean, Japanese and broader U.S. assets to intercept any nuclear missiles or technologies leaving the country. China and Russia should be prepared to face the consequences if they allow North Korean proliferation across their borders. Lastly, the United States must continue to prepare military options. Force will be necessary to deal with North Korea if it attacks first, but not through a preventive strike that could start a nuclear war. In the land of lousy options, no strategy is perfect, but some are better than others. This strategy gets us out of crisis-management mode. It constitutes decisive action, not previously attempted, by President Trump. And it demonstrates resolve to other bad actors that threats to the United States will be countered. Such a strategy would assuredly deplete Pyongyang’s hard currency, deter it from rash action, strengthen our alliances in Asia for the next generation and increase the costs to those who continue to subsidize Pyongyang. A sustained and long-term competitive strategy such as this plays to U.S. strengths, exploits our adversary’s weaknesses and does not risk hundreds of thousands of American lives. Document B Source B: Russell Korobkin, Article arguing for how aggressive techniques may work with North Korea. Why a petulant, erratic Trump may succeed in North Korea, LA Times, August, 11, 2017 So-called normal American administrations have been outfoxed by the Kim family for decades. The reclusive leaders of the Hermit Kingdom have known that the only thing the United States can do to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles to carry them is to start a war that would devastate the Korean peninsula. That option was, and is, so bad that the Kims have calculated that they could bluster, stall, make agreements only to break them, and generally thumb their noses at the West with no risk of serious consequences. Sure, the United States can organize economic sanctions, but the Kims have never cared if their people starved by the millions, just as long as there was enough money to feed the military and finance weapons programs. North Korea is certainly displeased with the latest United Nations sanctions regime, which is expected to reduce its exports by a third, but there is almost no chance this will be painful enough to convince Kim to give up his warheads. The sanctions, even if they are enforced, still permit North Korea to earn plenty of hard currency trading in what isn’t forbidden by the U.N. and sending guest workers to labor abroad. The only way to stop North Korea's march toward deliverable nuclear weapons, short of a bloodbath, would be for China to embargo all trade with and economic support of Pyongyang, effectively starving Kim's military. But while China doesn't love the idea of a nuclear North Korea, it has always preferred that to the risk of a destabilized regime perched on its border. North Korea's threat to take "physical action" and retaliate "thousands of times over" for the latest sanctions was bluster typical for that country's propaganda ministry. But Trump's "fire and fury" rejoinder is in sharp contrast to America's usual careful diplomatic language. Military and foreign affairs experts in the West have uniformly criticized Trump. When crazy goes toe to toe with crazy, escalation can potentially get out of hand and lead to war. North Korea has already raised the ante by specifically threatening to shoot missiles near Guam, which could trigger an American response. But the obvious danger of Trump facing off with Kim is precisely why rational Chinese leaders might reassess their nation's long-standing approach and intervene more decisively. If Beijing continues to allow Kim's pariah state to develop its nuclear capabilities, two events might occur that never before seemed likely. First, the United States might preemptively attack North Korea's nuclear weapons facilities, starting a conventional or even nuclear war along the 38th parallel. Trump's generals will probably prevent this from happening, but given the president's daily antics, who could possibly believe an attack is impossible? Second, fearing increasing unpredictability in Washington, Japan or South Korea could decide to develop its own nuclear deterrent rather than continuing to rely solely on American protection. Either a hot war or nuclear proliferation in its backyard would be much worse for China than any risks it might run by putting an end to Kim's nuclear ambitions. Its best strategy now is to finally take serious action against Pyongyang, completely shutting off of all commerce, including oil shipments, until North Korea gives up its nuclear program. In return, China can demand that the United States, along with South Korea and Japan, enter a treaty promising not to seek regime change that could threaten the existence of the Kim dynasty. A petulant, erratic North Korea has successfully defied the West for decades. A bombastic response from an equally petulant and erratic President Trump is both scary and dangerous, but it might just succeed where prior, rational American administrations have failed. Russell Korobkin, a professor of law at UCLA, is writing "The Ultimatum Game: The Science and Strategy of Negotiation." Document C Source C: Various authors, articles showcasing benefits and drawbacks to different diplomatic approached, How to stop Kim Jong Un, Time, February, 2018 The Dangers of a preemptive strike BY GREGORY F. TREVERTON More than one American President has been tempted by some form of preemptive attack on North Korea. However, the rub with preemption is that for the limited purpose of taking out the country’s nuclear program, it isn’t likely to work, and for the grander goal of decapitating the regime, success could create more problems than it solves. Military options against the North’s nuclear arsenal suffer from two problems: they might not succeed, and Pyongyang has devastating retaliatory options. Intelligence on the North’s nuclear program is pretty good but hardly perfect. Since the beginning, the country has hidden key facilities, and as its missiles become more mobile, they are harder to target. Airstrikes on nuclear facilities, coupled with cyberattacks and perhaps commando raids, could do some damage, but since the program is now entirely indigenous, it could be repaired soon enough. And it is hard to imagine Kim Jong Un doing nothing while the U.S. and its allies pounded his nuclear program. Seoul lies within artillery range of the North. Kim could retaliate even without using nuclear weapons. That would mean any attack on nuclear facilities would have to be accompanied by attacks on other installations threatening the South. In other words, the war would widen even before Kim retaliated. The other set of preemptive options, ones designed to overturn the regime, suffer their own set of imponderables. If Kim were killed, would the regime come apart or rally around the family? War gaming suggests a dangerous stew of violence, refugees and a race to control those nuclear weapons would ensue. In that stew, the gaming suggests, allies, not to mention China, would be as much of a problem as opposition from residual North Korean forces. As things stand, neither diplomacy nor sanctions seem likely to derail the North’s nuclear program. So regime change looks more and more attractive. But better that it come from within. Given Kim’s reckless habits—drinking and driving are two of his favorite pastimes—a self-inflicted biological solution is more than possible. So is the chance that an insider will finally get angry enough to take him out, never mind the consequences. Treverton, the former chair of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is executive adviser to SM&A Corporation Trump’s new wrinkle brings promise and risk BY KURT CAMPBELL A long recognized diplomatic truism is settling in for President Donald Trump: North Korea is the land of lousy options. Which may explain why he and his team have mostly followed a predictable playbook, announcing their intention to strengthen military deterrence with close allies, buttress U.S. defense assets in Asia and stiffen sanctions against the North Korean regime. The one new wrinkle appears to be that the Administration will seek to forcefully hold China responsible for North Korean provocations. Some senior U.S. officials are threatening to severely penalize any Chinese banks doing business with North Korea and to imitate the kinds of economic approaches and international coalitions successfully brought to bear on Iran under the Obama Administration. Although Beijing continues its calls for regional negotiations, the Trump team correctly counters that two decades of multilateral diplomacy have failed to contain the North. They now argue that China must do more to keep Kim Jong Un underfoot or at least at heel. Coupled with calls for key Europeans to also step up, an early entry for the Trump Doctrine may very well be: it’s up to you guys now. But Chinese assertiveness, North Korean provocations, Japanese anxieties and South Korean political turmoil are swirling dangerously across Northeast Asia. Normally, uneasiness there would prompt key Asian players to look to the U.S. for steadiness. But Trump’s questioning of the traditional American leadership role in Asia—champion of free trade, supporter of allies and keeper of the peace—has further unnerved Asian capitals. The Trump gambit to get China to do more may well lead to Beijing blinking first in a standoff with Washington over the Korean Peninsula. Yet a more dominant Chinese role in Korea carries with it other risks. American leadership is still seen as vital to the stability and prosperity of the entire region, the cockpit of the global economy. This is why even with lousy options, they all look better with the U.S. deeply engaged in the dangerously evolving Korean equation. Campbell was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2009 to 2013 How is the United States talking with North Korea right now?Update the graphic organizer by adding benefits and drawbacks to how the United States is talking with North Korea right now. Answer the question again:How should the US talk with North Korea? Construct a claim and a counterclaim that address the compelling question using evidence.
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